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INTRODUCTION

“He intended to do it before, ladies and gentlemen, so he must have
intended to do it again.”1
The quoted language above represents as simple, yet concise, a
formulation as possible of the forbidden propensity inference2 barred by
1. United States v. Lee, 724 F.3d 968, 976 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v.
Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 699 (7th Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 404(b), also known as the character
evidence rule,3 when used to prove a defendant’s intent. Due to the
prejudicial nature of this propensity inference,4 FRE 404(b) has resulted
in the highest number of published appellate decisions of any Federal
Rule of Evidence.5 In addition, the rule itself can often be confusing in
application and requires jurors to undertake extremely complicated
analyses.6 This confusion arises because the jury is instructed to ignore
the propensity inference quoted above and consider the uncharged
conduct evidence, any evidence of crimes or other actions of a
defendant other than the one for which he or she is currently on trial,7
only for non-character purposes.8
In 2011, an estimated 197,050 persons were sentenced under federal
jurisdiction.9 Of these persons, 94,600 were sentenced for a drug-related
crime.10 As such, there are a multitude of possession offenses that can
2. See infra Figure 1 for a concise interpretation of the character evidence rule and the
inferences prohibited by Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 404(b).
3. There are three general forms of character evidence used against defendants.
Jennifer Y. Schuster, Special Topic in the Law of Evidence, Uncharged Misconduct Under
Rule 404(b): The Admissibility of Inextricably Intertwined Evidence, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 947,
947 (1988). First, a witness may testify as to his or her personal opinion of the defendant. Id.
Second, a witness may testify about the defendant’s reputation. Id. Third, evidence can be
offered concerning the defendant’s past conduct. Id.
4. Id.
5. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence of an Accused’s Uncharged Misconduct
to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which Threaten to Engulf the Character Evidence
Prohibition, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 575, 577 (1990) (“Rule 404(b) has generated more published
opinions than any other subsection of the Federal Rules.”).
6. See H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and
Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 879 (1982) (noting that using uncharged
conduct to show knowledge or lack of mistake ultimately brands the defendant as a person
who acquired “criminal sophistication” and that from this brand, the jury naturally infers that
the defendant’s character trait as a person possessing criminal sophistication continued up
until the charged crime). In addition, Professor Uviller recognized the naïveté of legal
scholasticism in keeping the character evidence rule by saying, “[E]nunciation of the
[character] rule does more to satisfy legal scholasticism than to direct the minds of real jurors.
Although jurors seem to digest knotty principles, no one can believe in actual compliance
with instructions of this sort.” Id. at 869.
7. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct, 1 CRIM. JUST., Summer
1986, at 6, 7 [hereinafter Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct].
8. FED. R. EVID. 105 (announcing that evidence admissible for one purpose but not for
another purpose must be restricted by a limiting instruction to its proper scope on request).
9. E. Ann Carson & William J. Sabol, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2011, at 6
(2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8Z
JH-G6US.
10. Id. at 10.
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be used as uncharged conduct evidence in subsequent trials.11 However,
FRE 404(b) prohibits prosecutors from using these convictions as
evidence of a defendant’s bad character12 in a subsequent trial when
those convictions merely show that the defendant has acted in
conformity with his or her previous bad conduct.13 FRE 404(b)(1)–(2)
provide as follows:
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act
is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show
that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with
the character.
(2) Permitted Uses; Notice in a Criminal Case. This evidence
may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake, or lack of accident.14
A multitude of law review articles and other commentaries have
handled varying aspects of FRE 404(b).15
Essentially, FRE 404(b) is the codification of the common law
character evidence rule.16 Professor Edward J. Imwinkelried17 has

11. See Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct, supra note 7, at 7.
12. For the purposes of this Comment, “character” will be defined as “a concept of a
person’s psychological bent or frame of mind.” United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 921
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 440 U.S. 920 (1979); see Imwinkelried, supra note 5, at 578.
13. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
14. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1)–(2).
15. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, An Evidentiary Paradox: Defending the Character
Evidence Prohibition by Upholding a Non-Character Theory of Logical Relevance, The
Doctrine of Chances, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 419 (2006) [hereinafter Imwinkelried, An
Evidentiary Paradox]; Imwinkelried, supra note 5; Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct,
supra note 7; Kenneth J. Melilli, The Character Evidence Rule Revisited, 1998 BYU L. REV.
1547; Thomas J. Reed, Admitting the Accused’s Criminal History: The Trouble with Rule
404(b), 78 TEMP. L. REV. 201 (2005); Vivian M. Rodriguez, Special Topics in the Law of
Evidence, The Admissibility of Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts Under the Intent Provision of
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Weighing of Incremental Probity and Unfair Prejudice,
48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 451 (1993); Schuster, supra note 3; The Federal Rules of Evidence—Rule
404(b) Other Crimes Evidence: The Need for a Two-Step Analysis, 71 NW. U. L. REV. 634
(1977) [hereinafter Rule 404(b) Other Crimes Evidence].
16. Imwinkelried, An Evidentiary Paradox, supra note 15, at 421–22.
17. Professor of Law at the University of California, Davis. Edward J. Imwinkelried,
U.C. DAVIS SCH. L., https://law.ucdavis.edu/faculty/imwinkelried/ (last visited May 27, 2015),
archived at https://perma.cc/BML8-TRXE.
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created a chart that concisely demonstrates the character evidence rule
and the forbidden propensity inference that it bars.18
Figure 1

Item of Evidence
The accused’s
uncharged act.

Intermediate
Inference
The accused’s
subjective, personal
character, disposition
or propensity.

Ultimate Inference
The accused’s
conduct in
conformity with his
or her character on
the charged occasion.

As evident from the chart, the forbidden inference that a defendant has
acted in conformity with his or her bad character depends on the
intermediate inference that the defendant has a propensity for acting in
a certain way.19 FRE 404(b) bars the use of uncharged conduct when
used to establish only this propensity, but it allows uncharged conduct to
demonstrate any other non-character use.20 Of course, uncharged
conduct evidence admissible under FRE 404(b) is still subject to a FRE
403 balancing test of the evidence’s unfair prejudice versus its probative
value; a trial court will exclude that evidence where the unfair prejudice,
or other consideration, substantially outweighs its probative value.21
Part II of this Comment will develop a historical background to FRE
404(b). This background is meant to illustrate several of the concerns
surrounding FRE 404(b). First, this Comment will summarize the Court
18. Imwinkelried, supra note 5, at 576. When using propensity reasoning, the first step
is to infer the defendant’s “personal, subjective bad character” from his or her uncharged
conduct. Imwinkelried, An Evidentiary Paradox, supra note 15, at 426–27. This author will
use other versions of this chart in order to demonstrate points made both by other
commentators and by this author. However, the layout of these figures should be credited to
Professor Imwinkelried.
19. See Imwinkelried, supra note 5, at 576; supra Figure 1.
20. See infra Parts II.B–C for a discussion of the legislative history behind FRE 404(b)
and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ interpretation of FRE 404(b) shortly after its
adoption.
21. FRE 403 provides as follows: “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 403.
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of Appeals of New York’s foundational case, People v. Molineux.22
Molineux is essential in understanding the dichotomy between the
inclusionary/exclusionary approaches23 to the character evidence rule
that evolved out of the common law and how Congress considered these
approaches when adopting the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975.24
Second, this Comment will undertake an extremely brief inquiry into
the legislative history surrounding the adoption of FRE 404(b). That
legislative history will show how the inclusionary approach to the
character evidence rule took precedence over the exclusionary approach
with limited controversy at the time of FRE 404(b)’s adoption. Third, as
this Comment concerns itself specifically with uncharged conduct that
may or may not be probative of intent, this Comment will discuss the
leading federal court of appeals case, United States v. Beechum.25 That
case, considered by the Fifth Circuit en banc, provided an extremely
thorough and thoughtful analysis to the application of FRE 404(b) in
the context of uncharged conduct used to demonstrate a defendant’s
intent.26
Next, Part III of this Comment will break the federal courts of
appeals into two distinct camps: those that allow uncharged possession
evidence to be probative of a defendant’s intent to distribute and those
that do not.27 While the reasons for these differing approaches will be

22. 61 N.E. 286 (N.Y. 1901).
23. The inclusionary approach asks, “[I]s this evidence relevant otherwise than merely
through propensity?” Rule 404(b) Other Crimes Evidence, supra note 15, at 636 (alteration in
original) (quoting Julius Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51
HARV. L. REV. 988, 1005 (1938)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This inclusionary
approach emphasizes admissibility and flexibility; evidence is admissible unless it is solely
probative of a defendant’s character. Id. Likewise, a judge has the flexibility to admit
relevant evidence without worrying about pigeonholing the evidence into a limited number of
exceptions. Id. at 636–37. By contrast, the exclusionary approach asks, “Does this evidence
fall within any exception to the rule of exclusion?” Id. at 636 (quoting Stone, supra, at 1005)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
24. See Reed, supra note 15, at 202; infra Parts II.A–B. It is important to note that
every federal circuit court of appeals has interpreted FRE 404(b) as a rule of inclusion. 1
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 2:30–:31 (rev. ed.
2013). These courts allow uncharged conduct when it is offered for any purpose other than
the forbidden propensity inference. Id.
25. 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978).
26. See infra Part II.C for a discussion of the two-step test used by the Fifth Circuit to
determine a piece of evidence’s probative value on the issue of intent.
27. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 444 (3d Cir. 2013) (concluding that
uncharged possession evidence is never probative of intent to distribute); United States v.
Lee, 724 F.3d 968, 979 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Santini, 656 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir.
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considered more fully below, these circuits generally come to different
conclusions when answering one key question: Does a defendant who
contests his or her guilt for a specific intent crime28 automatically call
that intent into question, making any evidence proving his or her intent
probative on that point?29 This question, and its answers, effectively
split the circuits into these two camps. However, even within these two
camps, the extent to which uncharged possession evidence is probative
of a defendant’s intent to distribute differs from situation to situation.30
As such, Part IV of this Comment will analyze the different contexts
in which uncharged possession evidence is usually offered and will
determine whether the defendant’s uncharged possession evidence is
actually probative of his or her intent to distribute in each context.
Specifically, this section will look to see how various factors—including
the quantity of the drug possessed, the number of times the defendant
has been convicted of drug possession, and whether the defendant has
specifically called his or her intent into question—affect a court’s
determination of the probative value of this uncharged possession
evidence.
Finally, this author will argue that, while uncharged
possession evidence may be probative of a defendant’s intent to
distribute, such evidence should be inadmissible when the uncharged
conduct was a singular incident and dealt with a non-distribution-sized
2011); United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 721–22 (6th Cir. 2002) (concluding that
uncharged possession evidence is not similar enough to a distribution charge). But see United
States v. Logan, 121 F.3d 1172, 1178 (8th Cir. 1997) (concluding that uncharged possession
evidence is probative of intent to distribute because the defendant has controverted the issue
of intent); United States v. Butler, 102 F.3d 1191, 1196 (11th Cir. 1997) (same); United States
v. Gadison, 8 F.3d 186, 191–92 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Templeman, 965 F.2d 617, 619
(8th Cir. 1992) (concluding the same but adding that a defendant’s motive and opportunity to
distribute may be evidenced by an uncharged possession evidence).
28. The defining line between a specific intent crime and a general intent crime is
ambiguous. See Rodriguez, supra note 15, at 460. Generally, specific intent crimes involve a
state of mind that is separate from the mental state required in committing the actus reus of
the crime. Id. (citing 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON
CRIMINAL LAW § 28, at 202 (1972)); see also Reed, supra note 15, at 222 (noting that specific
intent is defined as “a special type of malevolent intent that prosecutors must prove in order
to establish the elements of offense”).
29. See infra Parts III.A–B, IV.A.
30. Compare Davis, 726 F.3d at 444 (concluding that uncharged possession evidence is
not probative of intent to distribute in any situation), and Lee, 724 F.3d at 979–80 (concluding
that the marginal probative value of uncharged conduct evidence is next to nothing unless the
defendant specifically calls his or her intent into question), and Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, and
Santini, 656 F.3d 1075, and United States v. Monzon, 869 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1989), with Logan,
121 F.3d at 1178 (concluding that uncharged possession evidence is probative of intent to
distribute), and Butler, 102 F.3d 1191, and Gadison, 8 F.3d 186, and Templeman, 965 F.2d 617.
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amount because in those instances the uncharged conduct lacks the
heightened probative value it possesses in other instances.31
II. FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 404(B):
A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND32
In order to properly analyze FRE 404(b), considerations of its
historical context resulting from (1) its common law foundation, (2) its
legislative history, and (3) how courts interpreted it immediately after its
adoption by Congress in 1975 are of the utmost importance.
A. Common Law Formulation Under Molineux
The current formulation of FRE 404(b), or an ideological
approximation of it, can be traced at common law to a single case,
People v. Molineux.33 In that case, the defendant was charged with the
first-degree murder of Katharine Adams by the use of cyanide
poisoning.34 The prosecution alleged that the defendant had sent a
package to Harry S. Cornish that contained a bottle of what appeared to
be Bromo Seltzer but was in fact cyanide.35 Due to Adams having a
headache the next morning, it was she, rather than Cornish, who took
the cyanide, believing it to be Bromo Seltzer.36 Shortly thereafter,
Adams turned a deep shade of blue, suffered immensely, and died.37
While Cornish had also taken a taste of the cyanide, the dose he took
was not lethal.38
31. See infra Part IV.D.
32. This author will begin with the foundational case, People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286
(N.Y. 1901). However, the character evidence rule has been around for centuries. See, e.g.,
Paul S. Milich, The Degrading Character Rule in American Criminal Trials, 47 GA. L. REV.
775, 777 (2013) (noting that the character rule appeared in English courts during the
Restoration Period). According to one commentator, early English cases did not specify a
rule of exclusion concerning character evidence, contrary to popular belief. Melilli, supra
note 15, at 1557–59. As a matter of fact, the test at common law preceding Molineux was the
ordinary test of relevance. See id. Accordingly, by the nineteenth century, the character
evidence rule had essentially the same characteristics as the inclusionary approach today. Id.
However, by the mid-nineteenth century the courts had started to shift to the exclusionary
approach. Id. at 1559; see infra Part II.A (discussing the exclusionary rule under Molineux).
33. 61 N.E. 286; see also Reed, supra note 15, at 202–12.
34. Molineux, 61 N.E. at 286–87.
35. Id. at 287.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 287–88. Interestingly, the authorities, in investigating Adams’s murder,
originally suspected Cornish on account of his own past. Randolph N. Jonakait, People v.
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The Molineux court separated the facts into categorical units,
starting with those facts that had no relation either to the defendant’s
handwriting or his uncharged conduct.39 The chief facts that relied on
non-propensity reasoning40 were that the defendant was proficient in
chemistry, had the ingredients to make cyanide, and had the motive to
kill Cornish due to some arguments between them.41 Further, the silver
bottle holder that stored the cyanide was purchased only a short
distance from the factory where the defendant was employed.42 The
chief facts that relied on propensity reasoning43 concerned the facts
surrounding the death of Henry C. Barnet (Barnet), another member of
Cornish and the defendant’s athletic club.44 Barnet was found dead in
his room with a box claiming to contain “Kutnow” powder, which
The prosecution attributed the
actually contained cyanide.45

Molineux and Other Crime Evidence: One Hundred Years and Counting, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1,
4 (2002). This past included suspicions that Cornish had broken up Mrs. Rodgers’s marriage
before he came to live with Mrs. Rodgers and Mrs. Adams. Id. at 4 n.11. However, the thendistrict attorney soon concluded that Cornish was not the killer but the victim:
History shows that [poisoning] is essentially a woman’s method of action. Women
acted thus in ancient times and following down through the ages we find the same
traits of character, the same outcropping of human nature. It is easy to surmise the
reason for this trait. Woman’s nature is essentially subtle. From deeds of blood and
violence she naturally shrinks. What then follows? Her scheming brain begins to
work. She turns to poison as the easiest and surest method, because if handled
deftly and cleverly it insures less suspicion and less possibility of detection. In the
Adams case there may be a man involved, but I think, as I have said before that a
woman is at the bottom of it and the prime mover, despite the many suppositions
and rumors that Mr. Cornish has an enemy in his own sex.
Id. at 4-5 (quoting JANE PEJSA, THE MOLINEUX AFFAIR, 125–26 (1983)). However, it
appears that the district attorney erred in his gross generalization about women, as Roland
Molineux soon became the chief suspect. See id. at 5.
39. Molineux, 61 N.E. at 288.
40. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
41. Molineux, 61 N.E. at 288. Cornish was the superintendent of an athletic club of
which the defendant was also a member. Id. As a result of this connection, the defendant
and Cornish had frequently butted heads over various matters including the conduct of other
members and whether Cornish had to obey the defendant’s instructions during events the
defendant had set up. Id. This animosity grew to the point that Cornish allegedly gossiped to
prominent members about the defendant’s profession, saying that he got his money from
making rum, and about the defendant’s morality, stating that he kept “a place of questionable
repute.” Id. at 288–89.
42. Id. at 289.
43. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
44. Molineux, 61 N.E. at 289.
45. Id. at 289–90.
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defendant’s motive for killing Barnet to Barnet’s attempts to win over
the defendant’s fiancée.46
After identifying the prosecution’s goals in offering the evidence, the
Molineux court decided the question whether evidence concerning
Barnet’s death was admissible.47 The court noted how the common law
rule at the time prohibited the state from using uncharged conduct
evidence (1) to establish “a foundation for a separate punishment,” or
(2) to prove the guilt of the crime charged.48 Further, the court noted
the then-existing state of the common law and its general exclusionary
nature with respect to uncharged conduct.49 This general exclusionary
character of the common law rule resulted from the proposition that
admitting uncharged conduct evidence would raise a presumption of
guiltinesshe who committed a crime in the past would be more likely
to commit the crime in the present case—rather than the required
presumption of innocence.50
While acknowledging that most uncharged conduct evidence is
inadmissible because it is logically irrelevant when not used to
demonstrate a propensity for committing bad acts, the court adopted
five general exceptions to that rule: (1) motive, (2) intent, (3) “absence
of mistake or accident”, (4) a common scheme or plan between two or
more crimes, and (5) identity.51 After noting each of these exceptions,
the court systematically refuted the logic behind admitting evidence of
the facts surrounding Barnet’s death under each of the exceptions.52 By
carefully noting each exception to the rule and then systematically
dismantling the alleged admissible purposes of the evidence, this rule,
sometimes known as Judge Werner’s rule, has been classified as a
“general exclusionary rule followed by a limited number of exceptions

46. Id. at 290.
47. Id. at 293.
48. Id. at 293–94 (noting the universally recognized liberty of an individual to be tried
on the crime actually in dispute and that individuals are presumed innocent until proven
guilty).
49. Id. at 294 (“The general rule is that when a man is put upon trial for one offense he
is to be convicted . . . by evidence which shows that he is guilty of that offense alone, and . . .
proof of his guilt of one or a score of other offenses . . . is wholly excluded.” (quoting People
v. Sharp, 14 N.E. 319, 343 (N.Y. 1887) (Peckham, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
50. See id.
51. Id. at 294; see also FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
52. Id. at 294–304.
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to the exclusionary rule.”53 In addition to Judge Werner’s formulation
of the character evidence rule, Judge Alton Parker, in a concurrence, set
forth an additional standard that is the basis for today’s character
evidence rule: “Do the facts constituting the other crime actually tend to
establish one or several elements of the crime charged? If so, they may
be proved.”54
B. A Brief Legislative History of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)
With respect to the operative language concerning uncharged
conduct evidence, the modern formulation of FRE 404(b) is
substantially similar to its text as adopted.55 As it was adopted, FRE
404(b) read as follows:
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of
a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.
It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.56
Not including the purely stylistic changes made to FRE 404(b) in 2011,57
the text of the current rule materially differs from its older formulation
only with respect to the requirement that prosecutors give defendants
notice in criminal cases before using uncharged conduct evidence
against the defendant.58
53. Reed, supra note 15, at 203 (noting that while Judge Werner’s rule can be viewed as
a “general exclusionary rule,” Judge Werner did not additionally undertake a test equivalent
to the Federal Rule of Evidence 403 balancing test weighing the probative value against the
threat of unfair prejudice).
54. Molineux, 61 N.E. at 314 (Parker, C.J., concurring); see also Reed, supra note 15, at
242 (“The persons responsible for the rule’s codification in 1972–1975 wanted a rule that
followed Judge Parker’s concurring opinion . . . .”). Judge Alton Parker’s approach to the
character evidence rule was a formulation of the inclusionary rule. Compare Molineux, 61
N.E. at 314 (Parker, C.J., concurring), and Reed, supra note 15, at 242, with infra Part II.B.
During the codification process of 1972–1975, Congress debated, but ultimately adopted, the
inclusionary approach to the character evidence rule. See infra Part II.B.
55. Compare FED. R. EVID. 404(b), with Rules of Evidence: Hearings on Proposed Rules
of Evidence Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Fed. Criminal Laws of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 122–23 (1973) [hereinafter Hearings].
56. Hearings, supra note 55, at 122–23 (using the language of the 1971 Advisory
Committee draft that was ultimately adopted even though it was arguing for a change to that
language).
57. See FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note on 2011 amendment.
58. See id. FRE 404(b)(2) provides as follows:
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Much of the very limited debate surrounding the adoption of FRE
404(b) concerned itself with the proper level of admissibility for
uncharged conduct evidence offered for non-character purposes.59
When the Supreme Court first submitted FRE 404(b) to Congress, the
rule read, “This subdivision [FRE 404(b)] does not exclude the evidence
when offered” for another, non-character purpose.60
However,
Congress changed the text of FRE 404(b) to read, “It may, however, be
admissible” for another, non-character purpose.61
While some debate surrounded this change in language,62 the
Committee on the Judiciary believed that this version of the rule placed
greater emphasis on the admissibility of uncharged conduct evidence.63
Because of the use of the word “may,” there was some concern that
On request by a defendant in a criminal case, the prosecutor must:
(A) provide reasonable notice of the general nature of any such evidence that the
prosecutor intends to offer at trial; and
(B) do so before trial—or during trial if the court, for good cause, excuses lack of
pretrial notice.
FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2). While this notice concern was addressed as early as the Criminal
Justice Subcommittee hearings in 1973, the prosecution’s obligation to give the defendant
notice was not in the 1975 version of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Rules of Evidence:
Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 203 (1973) [hereinafter Criminal Justice] (letter from
Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Professor of Law).
59. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 24–25 (1974); H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 7 (1973).
60. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 7.
61. Id. This formulation of the rule reflected statements in the 1971 Advisory
Committee draft rather than a subsequent amendment because the Committee sought to
emphasize the admissibility of uncharged conduct evidence under FRE 404(b). Id.
62. Compare H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 7 (noting that the 1971 Advisory Committee
draft emphasized uncharged conduct evidence’s admissibility), with Criminal Justice, supra
note 58, at 21–22 (letter from Edward W. Cleary, Reporter, to Herbert E. Hoffman, Counsel,
Special Subcomm. on Reform of Fed. Criminal Laws, Comm. on the Judiciary). Additionally,
some prominent members of the legal profession, chiefly Chief Judge Friendly of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, questioned the need for an evidence code entirely. See Hearings,
supra note 55, at 261 (statement of Judge Henry J. Friendly, C.J., U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit) (“[I]n legal matters, when it is not necessary to do anything, it is
necessary to do nothing.”). With respect to FRE 404(b), Judge Friendly had some more
specific problems:
Does [FRE 404(b)] adopt the “federal rule” allowing evidence of other crimes
except when offered only to show the defendant is a bad man, or the rule requiring
that these crimes show some particular trait relevant to the charge? The rule seems
to walk both sides of the street. It will provide a bountiful source of appeals and
possible reversals on a subject where the federal law is now reasonably clear.
Id. at 263.
63. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 7.
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judges would view FRE 404(b) as a discretionary rule giving them the
authority to independently exclude such evidence.64 However, with
respect to uncharged conduct evidence, the legislative history is clear on
the point that the rule itself was not meant to give trial judges the
discretion to exclude otherwise relevant uncharged conduct.65 Indeed,
in an October 1974 report, the Committee on the Judiciary made clear
that the only discretion a court has with respect to uncharged conduct
evidence relevant to a non-character purpose is his or her ability to
exclude such evidence under FRE 403.66 When such evidence is
relevant under FRE 404(b), a trial judge may exclude the evidence only
when its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial
effect or other deleterious concerns such as waste of time or confusion
of the issues.67 This formulation of the character evidence rule reflects
Judge Parker’s inclusionary rule because it only bars character evidence
when that evidence is not relevant to a non-character purpose.68
C. Modern Approach Under United States v. Beechum
When a defendant genuinely contests the intent element of a crime,
FRE 404(b) provides the prosecution with the opportunity to present
evidence of uncharged conduct69 to prove the defendant’s intent.70 The

64. Criminal Justice, supra note 58, at 344.
65. Id. at 344 (“Only if the probative value of [uncharged conduct evidence] is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, are they properly excludable.”).
66. S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 24–25 (1974) (“[T]he discretionary word ‘may’. . . is not
intended to confer any arbitrary discretion on the trial judge. Rather, it is anticipated that
with respect to permissible uses for such evidence, the trial judge may exclude it only on the
basis of those considerations set forth in Rule 403, i.e. prejudice, confusion or waste of
time.”).
67. Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 403.
68. See Milich, supra note 32, at 778 (“The history of the ‘other uses’ exception [to the
character evidence rule], currently known as Rule 404(b), is one of inexorable expansion,
ultimately swallowing all but remnants of the prohibition against character evidence.”); supra
Part II.A and accompanying text.
69. The court in Beechum used the term “extrinsic offense” rather than other terms so
as to avoid confusion. United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 902 n.1 (5th Cir. 1978). This
perceived confusion resulted from some courts using the term “prior” or “similar” offenses.
Id. Both of these terms result in confusion because (1) the term “prior” is unduly restrictive,
as uncharged conduct occurring after the charged crime would also be logically equivalent to
conduct occurring before the charged crime, and (2) the term “similar” connotes the idea that
the other act is similar in nature to the charged act rather than to the purpose for which it is
admitted. Id. This author chooses to use the term “uncharged conduct” throughout this
Comment as it takes into account the concerns elucidated by Beechum and is the closest to
the prevalent terminology in modern legal literature.
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Fifth Circuit case United States v. Beechum71 presents exactly that issue.
The facts presented in Beechum are relatively straightforward: Orange
Jell Beechum (Beechum) was a substitute mail carrier for the Postal
Service and was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1708, theft of U.S.
mail, for the unlawful possession of an 1890 silver dollar.72 The only
issue contested at the trial was whether Beechum had intended to return
the coin or to keep it.73 In order to prove Beechum’s intent to possess
the coin, the government introduced into evidence the fact that when
police officers searched Beechum to find the coin, they also found two
credit cards.74 These cards did not belong to Beechum and were not
signed; rather, the cards belonged to two people living on one of
Beechum’s previous mail routes.75
Looking at the admissibility of the credit cards with respect to
Beechum’s intent towards the coin, the court framed the question
simply, “[W]hy would Beechum give up the silver dollar if he kept the
credit cards”?76 In answering this question, the court adopted a two-step
test77: First, the uncharged conduct evidence must be relevant to an issue
that is not the defendant’s character.78 Second, under FRE 403, the
evidence’s risk of unfair prejudice cannot substantially outweigh its
probative value.79 The need for this test resulted from a straightforward

70. Id. at 909 (“But where the defendant testifies to controvert an element of the
Government’s case, such as intent, to which the [uncharged conduct] is highly relevant, the
integrity of the judicial process commands that the defendant be faced with that offense.”);
see also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., 22B FEDERAL PRACTICE
& PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE § 5242, at 153 (2014) (noting that some
courts also require the intent to be a material issue in the trial); Barry Tarlow, RICO Report,
The Past as a Predictor: Is Prior Drug Use Probative of Future Distribution?, 27 CHAMPION
66, 66 (2003).
71. 582 F.2d 898.
72. Id. at 903.
73. See id. at 910.
74. Id. at 903.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 909.
77. See Rule 404(b) Other Crimes Evidence, supra note 15, at 636. This test is essentially
the same test used by the United States Courts of Appeals today. See infra Part III.
78. Beechum, 582 F.2d at 911; see also Mellili, supra note 15, at 1569 (noting that
attempting to offer character evidence for a non-character purpose can be extremely
complicated due to the fine metaphysical lines between non-character purposes and character
purposes).
79. Beechum, 582 F.2d at 911. In limiting this unfair prejudice, a court may use its
discretionary powers to assure that the least possible prejudicial effect of the relevant
evidence reaches the jury. See Rule 404(b) Other Crimes Evidence, supra note 15, at 642; see
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reading of the un-restyled FRE 404(b).80 That rule stated, “Evidence of
[uncharged conduct] is not admissible to prove the character of a person
. . . to show . . . conformity [with that character]. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as . . . intent . . . .”81 This rule states
the principle that uncharged conduct should not be admissible when
used only to show the defendant’s deficient character.82 Further, FRE
404(b) does not make uncharged conduct inadmissible because it is not
probative whatsoever.83 The probative value of the evidence is clear: a
man who has a bad character is more likely to commit crimes than
someone with a good character.84 However, uncharged conduct
evidence is generally deemed inadmissible when used solely to prove the
defendant’s deficient character because the Federal Rules have deemed
the threat of unfair prejudice in those cases to substantially outweigh the
evidence’s probative value.85
also FED. R. EVID. 105 (“If the court admits evidence that is admissible against a party or for
a purpose—but not against another party or for another purpose—the court, on timely
request, must restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.”).
The Advisory Committee notes following FRE 105 are also particularly important when
discussing character evidence. These notes provide that there is a close relationship between
FRE 105 and FRE 403. See FED. R. EVID. 105, advisory committee’s notes. Often, the
admissibility of the evidence may turn on whether the jury has been properly instructed as to
the permissible purposes of the evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 105, advisory committee’s notes.
For an example of a court’s creative use of its discretionary powers, see United States v.
Jackson, 405 F. Supp. 938, 945 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that evidence of defendant’s flight
from authorities while armed would be inadmissible provided that the defendant stipulate to
the fact that he was in the area shortly after a robbery and that he had used a false name).
80. See Beechum, 582 F.2d at 910.
81. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 404(b)).
82. Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
83. See Beechum, 582 F.2d at 910; see also, e.g., Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S.
469, 475–76 (1948) (“[S]uch facts might logically be persuasive that [the defendant] is by
propensity a probable perpetrator of the crime.”). The Supreme Court in Michelson noted
that, while the law does not allow a defendant’s bad acts to be probative of his or her bad
character, the law does not presume that the defendant has good character. Michelson, 335
U.S. at 475 (citing Greer v. United States, 245 U.S. 559 (1918)). In Greer, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes recognized that, in cases where the defendant’s character is not itself an
element of the crime, the defendant has the choice of whether to introduce evidence to prove
his or her own character and subject that character to attack by the government. Greer, 245
U.S. at 559–61. The only presumption regarding the defendant in these cases that even
slightly bears on character is that he or she is presumed innocent until proven guilty. Id. at
559–60.
84. Beechum, 582 F.2d at 910; see supra Figure 1.
85. Beechum, 582 F.2d at 910. However, commentators have questioned whether FRE
404(b) serves even this basic exclusionary purpose. See Milich, supra note 32, at 779 (noting
that FRE 404(b) has, over time, excluded an increasingly smaller and smaller subset of
uncharged conduct).
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With respect to the first step of this two-step analysis in admitting
uncharged conduct, the relevance of the uncharged conduct is a function
of the uncharged conduct’s similarity to the offense charged.86 While
the similarity of the uncharged conduct and the offense charged is
crucial to this analysis, the analysis in fact depends on a special type of
similarity.87 This similarity, and hence the relevance of the uncharged
conduct, depends on whether the uncharged conduct is probative of the
issue in controversy for the offense charged.88 In Beechum, the
relevancy of the uncharged conduct, Beechum’s possession of the credit
cards, depended on whether the defendant in fact had the same intent
during both the perpetration of the uncharged conduct and the offense
charged.89
Further, because the relevancy of the uncharged conduct is
conditioned on whether the uncharged conduct was in fact committed
and whether the defendant committed the uncharged conduct, the
uncharged conduct must be found conditionally relevant under FRE
104(b).90 This rule requires the trial judge to decide “whether there is
86. Beechum, 582 F.2d at 911.
87. Id.
88. Id.; see also Julius Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England,
46 HARV. L. REV. 954, 955 (1933) (noting that the term “similar” as applied to the character
evidence rule had not been scrutinized, and undertaking that scrutiny). Saying that one fact is
similar to another implies that the facts share some common features, but it also implies that
the facts do not share every feature; otherwise, they would be identical. See id. In addition,
similarity should be viewed in the context of “the purpose of the inquiry at hand.” Id. As
such, this author will use the term “similar” throughout this Comment to signify the
relationship between the uncharged possession evidence and its purpose, i.e., its ability to
prove the defendant’s intent. If the uncharged conduct evidence is to be probative of that
intent, the intent possessed by the defendant during the uncharged conduct must be the same
type of intent as allegedly possessed by the defendant with respect to the charged crime.
89. See Beechum, 582 F.2d at 911. The court in Beechum noted that this line of
reasoning, requiring the uncharged conduct to evidence “the same state of mind” as the
offense charged, is only essential in cases where the uncharged conduct is being used to show
the defendant’s intent. Id. at 911 n.15. For example, a prosecutor may show a defendant’s
financial troubles to establish a motive for robbery by introducing evidence of uncharged
conduct where “the defendant had been threatened for nonpayment of a debt incurred in a
drug transaction.” Id. (citing United States v. Johnson, 525 F.2d 999, 1006 (2d Cir. 1975)).
The importance of this uncharged conduct is how it tends to establish the issue in the present
case, the defendant’s motive for the robbery, rather than the overall similarity between the
two offenses. Id.
90. Id. at 912–13; see also Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988)
(holding that uncharged conduct evidence must be conditionally relevant). FRE 104(b)
provides as follows: “(b) Relevance That Depends on a Fact. When the relevance of evidence
depends on whether a fact exists, proof must be introduced sufficient to support a finding that
the fact does exist. The court may admit the proposed evidence on the condition that the
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sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the defendant in fact
committed the [uncharged conduct]” in cases where the uncharged
conduct is the conditional fact.91 This standard establishes a very low
threshold for a prosecutor to meet, as it allows the judge to deny the
evidence only when he or she decides that no reasonable jury could have
found the conditional fact—the defendant’s commission of the
uncharged conduct—by a preponderance of the evidence.92
Once the prosecution proves that the uncharged conduct is (1)
similar to the offense charged with respect to the issue in controversy
and (2) conditionally relevant, in that the judge believes the jury could
reasonably find that the defendant in fact committed the uncharged
conduct, the evidence is deemed relevant and must be weighed against
the potential for unfair prejudice.93 FRE 403 undertakes this weighing
by measuring the probative value of a piece of evidence against its
potential for unfair prejudice.94 Courts will admit the evidence unless
the potential for unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative
proof be introduced later.” FED. R. EVID. 104(b) (title case omitted). The Advisory
Committee Notes to FRE 104(b) provide an apt hypothetical to easily demonstrate
conditional admissibility: If a spoken statement is being used to prove that X had notice of the
statement’s contents, it must also be shown that X actually heard the statement. The
conditional fact would be the spoken statement. That statement’s relevancy would depend on
whether X heard the statement. See FED. R. EVID. 104(b), advisory committee’s notes.
91. Beechum, 582 F.2d at 913 (citing Edmund M. Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury
in the Determination of Preliminary Questions of Fact, 43 HARV. L. REV. 165 (1929)).
92. See Beechum, 582 F.2d at 913.
93. Id. at 913; see also Calvin W. Sharpe, Two-Step Balancing and the Admissibility of
Other Crimes Evidence: A Sliding Scale of Proof, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 556, 566 (1984).
Sharpe argues that depending on the risk of prejudice, some uncharged conduct should
require a higher level of proof in terms of FRE 104(b). See Sharpe, supra, at 566–67. Despite
the now-conventional approach to FRE 104(b), see Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 689–90 (holding
that the standard of proof for conditionally relevant facts is whether a reasonable jury could
find the fact by a preponderance of the evidence), Sharpe discussed differing situations where
uncharged conduct poses a heightened risk of unfair prejudice. Sharpe, supra, at 566–67. In
general, there are two types of “high risk” evidence, crimes that are inherently egregious,
such as murder, or crimes that are extremely similar to the crime charged. Id. For a more
recent discussion of changing the standards of proof for conditionally relevant facts, see Jason
Tortora, Note, Reconsidering the Standards of Admission for Prior Bad Acts Evidence in
Light of Research on False Memories and Witness Preparation, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1493
(2013) (arguing for courts to adopt the standard of proof purveyed by Huddleston because of
the risks associated with witness interviewing and preparation).
94. Beechum, 582 F.2d at 913; see also Melilli, supra note 15, at 1555 (noting that
admission is not automatic because (1) notice must be given ahead of time, (2) the uncharged
conduct must satisfy FRE 104(b)’s conditional admissibility requirements, (3) the evidence
must have a valid non-character purpose, and (4) the judge must undertake an FRE 403
balancing test).

2015]

A PROSECUTOR’S GUIDE TO CHARACTER EVIDENCE

1399

value.95 Further, in undertaking this balancing test, courts must
determine whether the evidence is unfairly prejudicial by using a
“commonsense assessment of all the circumstances surrounding the
[uncharged conduct].”96
In applying this commonsense assessment, courts consider whether
there are other ways to prove the issue and whether other facts available
could have the same effectiveness in proving the contested issue.97 As
such, the probative value, which is weighed against the unfair prejudice,
is the marginal probative value of the evidence as determined by
comparing these other means of proving the issue in controversy.98
Along the same line, Beechum reasoned that in two situations the
marginal probative value of the uncharged conduct would be
substantially diminished and almost certainly require its exclusion:
situations where the government already has a strong case on the issue
in controversy and situations where the defendant has not contested the
issue.99 However, while Beechum acknowledged that this marginal
probative value would be negligible in situations where the defendant
has not contested the issue, Beechum did not answer the question
whether merely pleading not guilty puts a defendant’s intent at issue
when the crime requires a specific intent.100
Applying this two-step test to Beechum’s uncharged conduct, the
Beechum court held that Beechum’s intent with respect to his possession
of the credit cards was admissible to prove his intent to possess the silver

95. See FED. R. EVID. 403; see also Beechum, 582 F.2d at 913.
96. Beechum, 582 F.2d at 914.
97. See id.
98. Id.; see also Rodriguez, supra note 15, at 455 (describing this marginal probative
value as “incremental probity”). This author uses the term “marginal probative value” to
denote the differences between the probativeness of evidence under FRE 401 and FRE 403.
Under FRE 401, the probative value of the evidence is generally considered to be whether
the evidence has “any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without
the evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 401. By contrast, the probative value of the evidence under
FRE 403 can be raised or lowered by a number of factors including the extent to which the
evidence establishes a fact at issue and whether other evidence establishes that same fact. See
Beechum, 582 F.2d at 914; David A. Sonenshein, The Misuse of Rule 404(b) on the Issue of
Intent in the Federal Courts, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 215, 232 (2011).
99. Beechum, 582 F.2d at 914.
100. Id. at 914–15; see also WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 70, § 5242, at 151 (noting
that intent is an ultimate issue in the case); infra Part IV.A (arguing that courts should require
intent to be a material issue at trial before allowing uncharged conduct evidence to
demonstrate the defendant’s intent).
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coin.101 First, as the issue in controversy centered on whether
Beechum’s intent was lawful, evidence that diminished or increased the
likelihood that Beechum lawfully possessed the silver dollar would be
relevant towards that issue.102 Second, in determining whether the risk
of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value, the court
determined that the evidence’s marginal probative value approached its
general probative value.103 This extremely high marginal probative
value resulted from several factors: (1) the defendant had clearly called
the question of his intent into controversy from the beginning of the trial
by conceding every other point;104 (2) principles of justice required the
admission of evidence when the defendant offered exculpatory evidence
on the same point;105 (3) Beechum’s possession of the credit cards
directly related to the plausibility of his story;106 (4) all the other
evidence that the government could show with respect to the
defendant’s intent was contested and did not create a strong case;107
(5) Beechum possessed the credit cards at the exact moment when he
possessed the silver dollar.108 As such, the court found the evidence
both relevant towards Beechum’s intent and probative of that intent.109
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Beechum paved the
way for the courts deciding the admissibility of uncharged conduct
evidence with respect to drug possession.110
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT ANALYSIS
Despite Beechum’s in-depth analysis of the inner workings of FRE
404(b),111 several of the federal courts of appeals have split over whether

101. Beechum, 582 F.2d at 918.
102. See Beechum, 582 F.2d at 916; see also FED. R. EVID. 401.
103. Beechum, 582 F.2d at 916.
104. Id.
105. Id. These principles of justice are that a defendant waives his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination on cross-examination when he or she offers exculpatory
evidence because the defendant has called that issue into question and the jury has a right to
every man’s evidence. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 917.
108. Id. Because this possession occurred simultaneously, Beechum’s possession of the
credit cards would “constantly remind him of the wrongfulness of their possession. In effect,
Beechum’s state of mind with respect to the credit cards continued through his arrest.” Id.
109. See id.
110. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
111. See Beechum, 582 F.2d 898.
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uncharged possession evidence may be probative of a person’s intent to
distribute drugs.112 Making this inquiry, the circuits generally follow a
four-part test:113
(1) the evidence [must be] directed toward establishing a
matter in issue other than the defendant’s propensity to commit
the crime charged;
(2) the evidence shows that the other act is similar enough
and close enough in time to be relevant to the matter at issue;
(3) the evidence is sufficient to support a jury finding that the
defendant committed the other act; and
(4) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.114
While some circuits have laid out the test slightly differently, not
explicitly stating that the uncharged conduct has to itself be proven or
adding a requirement that limiting instructions be given when
requested,115 this test merely serves to establish the two inquiries laid out
in Beechum: (1) The proponent of the evidence must have a nonpropensity purpose for offering the uncharged conduct, and (2) after a
non-propensity purpose has been established, the evidence must meet

112. See United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434 (3d Cir. 2013); United States v. Lee, 724
F.3d 968 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Santini, 656 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2011); United States
v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Ono, 918 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Monzon, 869 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1989), for analyses concluding that prior
possession is not probative of intent. But see United States v. Logan, 121 F.3d 1172 (8th Cir.
1997); United States v. Butler, 102 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Gadison, 8
F.3d 186 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Templeman, 965 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1992), for
analyses concluding that prior possession is probative of intent. One other commentator has
briefly discussed the issue of whether prior drug use is probative of a defendant’s intent to
distribute. See Tarlow, supra note 70. However, that article, while addressing the circuit split
as it existed in 2003, did not focus on scrutinizing the probative value of uncharged possession
evidence in different scenarios. Compare Tarlow, supra note 70, at 67–71, with infra Part IV.
Further, since that article was published, the Third and Seventh Circuits have recently
weighed in on the circuit split. See Davis, 726 F.3d 434; Lee, 724 F.3d 968. In particular, the
Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Lee is especially important to this author’s overview of the circuit
split, as the Seventh Circuit directly confronted a situation where the defendant claimed an
innocent bystander defense. See Lee, 724 F.3d at 976; infra Part IV.A.
113. See, e.g., Davis, 726 F.3d at 441; Lee, 724 F.3d at 975; Santini, 656 F.3d at 1077–78;
Haywood, 280 F.3d at 719–20; Monzon, 869 F.2d at 344.
114. Lee, 724 F.3d at 975.
115. See Davis, 726 F.3d at 441. For an extensive recitation of the tests invoked by each
circuit in determining whether uncharged conduct evidence is probative of intent, see
Sonenshein, supra note 98, at 224 n.67 (collecting cases and laying out the general four- or
three-part test for every circuit).
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all the other relevance requirements imposed on any other piece of
evidence.116
A. Circuits That Exclude Uncharged Possession Evidence to Show
Intent to Distribute
Recently, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals revisited this circuit split and have further
driven a wedge between the circuits.117 In applying the four-prong test
above,118 courts that have excluded prior possession evidence have done
so for several reasons: (1) the defendants’ intents were not at issue;119 (2)
even assuming that the uncharged conduct was relevant toward a
permissible end, logic dictated that the prosecution was merely making a
propensity argument;120 (3) the intent to possess drugs and the intent to
distribute drugs were sufficiently dissimilar.121
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has been particularly
outspoken about ensuring that the defendant has actually placed his or
her intent at issue when considering whether to admit uncharged
possession evidence.122 In making this determination in United States v.
Lee,123 the Seventh Circuit noted that a defendant who claims he or she
is innocent, and thereby forces the government to prove his or her

116. Davis, 726 F.3d at 441 (“All this really means is that such evidence must have a
nonpropensity purpose and satisfy the same relevancy requirements as any other evidence.”).
117. Davis, 726 F.3d 434; Lee, 724 F.3d 968; see also supra Part II.B.
118. See supra text accompanying note 114.
119. Lee, 724 F.3d at 976 (noting that judges evaluating FRE 404(b) evidence should
“consider first the extent to which a defendant has genuinely placed at issue the specific
matter that the evidence is being offered to establish”); see also United States v. Monzon, 869
F.2d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that even where the crime charged is a specific intent
crime, thereby putting intent squarely at issue, the evidence must meet other relevancy
requirements before it can be admitted).
120. Lee, 724 F.3d at 976–77; United States v. Santini, 656 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir.
2011) (noting that the uncharged conduct was for “simple possession” and therefore not
similar enough to the charged offense to be probative); Monzon, 869 F.2d at 344 (noting that
the marijuana butts were classic character evidence “designed to show that the defendant had
a bad character and acted in conformity therewith” and was not similar enough to the charged
offense to be probative).
121. Davis, 726 F.3d at 444; see Monzon, 869 F.2d at 344 (noting the dissimilar natures
between uncharged possession evidence and intent to distribute).
122. See Lee, 724 F.3d at 976; United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 696–97 (7th Cir.
2012) (holding that a prior drug dealing conviction in 2000 is not indicative of an intent to
distribute nearly eight years later when the defendant claims to have been an innocent
bystander).
123. 724 F.3d 968.
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specific intent, should not be considered to have opened the door to
whatever uncharged conduct evidence the prosecution desires to have
admitted.124
The Seventh Circuit found a crucial distinction between a defendant
who raises an innocent bystander defense and one who claims that he or
she was going to use the drugs for a different, albeit still illegal,
purpose.125 The distinction between these two situations is that where a
defendant actively puts intent at issue by claiming not to have intended
to use the drugs for a specific purpose, the defendant has actively made
the evidence more probative on the point of intent.126 Unlike where the
defendant actively puts intent at issue, a defendant claiming to be an
innocent bystander only formally puts intent into question by
challenging his guilt for the crime charged.127 This innocent bystander
defense would not have raised “particular questions—about what he
knew, what his purpose was, and whether his proximity to the [drugs]
was inadvertent—that his prior [drug] conviction might help the jury to
answer.”128
In addition to questioning whether intent is in dispute, courts finding
uncharged possession evidence inadmissible have considered the chain
of logic leading from the uncharged conduct to the permissible inference
of intent and decided whether propensity reasoning is involved.129
Despite FRE 404(b)’s bar on propensity reasoning regarding the
defendant’s character, there is always a danger that jurors will use
uncharged conduct for this reasoning even where instructed
otherwise.130 Some courts, like the Third Circuit in United States v.

124. Id. at 976; see also United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 909 (5th Cir. 1978).
125. Lee, 724 F.3d at 976.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 979.
129. Id. at 976–77 (noting that “the court must consider the chain of logic by which the
jury is being asked to glean the defendant’s knowledge, intent, etc. from proof of his prior
misdeeds”) (citing United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 697–98); see United States v.
Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 723 (6th Cir. 2002) (reasoning that Haywood’s uncharged possession
of crack cocaine branded him as a criminal and unfairly prejudiced him in the eyes of the
jury); United States v. Monzon, 869 F.2d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that the marijuana
was classic character evidence).
130. United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 444 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Monzon, 869 F.2d
at 344 (noting the evidence as only proving that the defendant was a bad man with bad
character); Uviller, supra note 6, at 879 (noting that the natural inference of uncharged
conduct evidence is that the defendant has bad character).
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Davis,131 have held that uncharged possession evidence is always
inadmissible because using that evidence will necessarily involve
propensity reasoning.132 Other courts, like the Seventh Circuit in Lee,
have held uncharged possession evidence inadmissible but have failed to
say that it is always inadmissible.133
Further, courts barring uncharged possession evidence to
demonstrate intent to distribute have denied the probative value of such
evidence.134 While these courts have found that other drug-related
uncharged conduct evidence may be probative of intent to distribute,135
these courts have denied that a “possession conviction impl[ies] an
intent to distribute.”136 Indeed, these courts have held that uncharged
possession evidence is “of a wholly different order than acts involving
the distribution of a controlled substance. One activity involved the
131. Davis, 726 F.3d 434.
132. Davis, 726 F.3d at 445; Haywood, 280 F.3d at 721 (noting that a small amount of a
drug used for personal use on one occasion is not probative of intent to distribute the same
drug several months later); see also United States v. Santini, 656 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir.
2011) (noting similar); Monzon, 869 F.2d at 344 (“[T]he evidence must be directed toward
establishing a matter in issue other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime
charged.”).
133. Lee, 724 F.3d at 982 (holding that innocent-bystander defenses do not
automatically open the door to uncharged conduct evidence but that in cases where the
defendant specifically puts his or her intent at issue the uncharged conduct is more likely to
be probative of a defendant’s intent to distribute).
134. Id. at 979 (“[I]t is not obvious how the prior [possession] conviction would shed
light on Lee’s intent.”); Haywood, 280 F.3d at 721 (criticizing other circuits for failing to
recognize that possessing a drug requires a completely different intent than intending to
distribute that drug); Monzon, 869 F.2d at 344 (noting that the evidence must be similar and
close in time to the charged offense to be relevant).
135. In United States v. Lopez, 340 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 2003), the Third Circuit held that a
prior conviction resulting from a conspiracy to distribute charge was probative of the
defendant’s claim that he was an innocent bystander. See id. at 172, 174. Similarly, the Third
Circuit reasoned in United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452 (3d Cir. 2003) that a conviction for
distribution of cocaine was admissible in a trial for heroin distribution. Id. at 461. However,
the Third Circuit viewed these cases as “the outer bounds of admissibility under Rule 404(b)”
and distinguished these cases on the rationale that drug dealers will have more knowledge of
drugs in general than someone who has merely possessed the drugs previously. Davis, 726
F.3d at 444. Along similar reasoning, other circuits have suggested that uncharged
distribution evidence, as opposed to uncharged possession evidence, would be probative of a
defendant’s intent to distribute. Haywood, 280 F.3d at 721 (noting that drug possession is an
entirely different offense than drug distribution because of the quantities involved) (citing
United States v. Ono, 918 F.2d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1990)); Monzon, 869 F.2d at 344 (“This is
not a case where the evidence sought to be introduced is so similar to the crime charged—for
example, another act of distribution of cocaine for which the Defendant was not charged—
that the relevance is clear.”).
136. Davis, 726 F.3d at 444; see also Haywood, 280 F.3d at 721; Ono, 918 F.2d at 1465.
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personal abuse of narcotics.
The other usually involves the
‘implementation of a commercial activity for profit.’”137 Because these
courts conclude that uncharged possession evidence is not probative of a
defendant’s intent to distribute, they hold that allowing uncharged
possession evidence would completely undermine FRE 404(b)’s
prohibition on propensity reasoning because any crime could be
admissible under a similar reasoning.138
As such, courts excluding uncharged possession evidence do so for
three reasons. First, there is a question as to whether the defendant has
actively placed his or her intent into dispute.139 Second, these courts are
wary of hidden propensity rationales.140 Third, the intent behind
possessing a drug is intrinsically different from the intent to distribute
that drug.141
B. Circuits That Admit Uncharged Possession Evidence to Show Intent
to Distribute
Courts that have allowed uncharged possession evidence to prove
intent to distribute have relied on two main rationales: (1) By pleading
not guilty to an intent to distribute offense, the defendant has put his or
her intent at issue to the extent that the probative value of the
uncharged possession evidence will likely outweigh its prejudicial
effect,142 and (2) uncharged possession evidence is independently
probative of a defendant’s intent to distribute drugs.143
First, courts finding uncharged possession evidence admissible to
show a defendant’s intent to distribute reason that the defendant has
137. Davis, 726 F.3d at 444 (citation omitted) (quoting Ono, 918 F.2d at 1465); see also
Haywood, 280 F.3d at 721 (quoting Ono, 918 F.2d at 1465).
138. Davis, 726 F.3d at 444 (“A rule allowing [uncharged possession evidence to
establish intent to distribute] would eviscerate almost entirely the character evidence rule.”
(quoting DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENCE OF OTHER MISCONDUCT
AND SIMILAR EVENTS § 7.5.2(d) (2009))).
139. Lee, 724 F.3d at 976; United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2012); see
infra Part IV.A (arguing that only material issues should warrant the introduction of
uncharged conduct evidence to prove intent).
140. See Lee, 724 F.3d at 976–77; Haywood, 280 F.3d at 723; Miller, 673 F.3d at 697–98.
141. Davis, 726 F.3d at 444; Haywood, 280 F.3d at 721; Ono, 918 F.2d at 1465.
142. See United States v. Logan, 121 F.3d 1172, 1178 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Butler, 102 F.3d 1191, 1195–96 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Gadison, 8 F.3d 186, 192 (5th
Cir. 1993); United States v. Templeman, 965 F.2d 617, 619 (8th Cir. 1992).
143. See Templeman, 965 F.2d at 619; see also Haywood, 280 F.3d at 726 (Gibson, J.
dissenting) (arguing that medium-sized amounts of drugs in possession cases may indeed be
independently probative of a defendant’s intent to distribute).
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placed his or her intent at issue, thereby raising the probative value of
the uncharged conduct.144 These courts have determined that, in cases
where the defendant has put his intent at issue by pleading not guilty to
an intent to distribute charge, uncharged possession evidence is relevant
to prove intent to distribute even in a “subsequent, unrelated
prosecution for the distribution of drugs.”145 Further, these courts do
not require the defendant to raise a defense based on lack of knowledge
or lack of intent.146 As such, these courts summarily determine that
uncharged possession evidence is probative of someone’s intent to
distribute.147
Second, while these courts have all determined that uncharged
possession evidence is probative on the issue of intent to distribute,148
only one of them has affirmatively spelled out how uncharged
possession evidence is probative on intent even where a defendant has
not specifically called into question his intent to distribute.149 Judge
Gibson noted in dissent in United States v. Haywood150 that evidence of
possession tends to show that the person carrying that drug has a
familiarity with the trade itself that would support the inference that he
or she intended to distribute it.151 This inference can be drawn because a
defendant has both the motive and opportunity to distribute drugs as a
result of his possession of the drug.152 First, the defendant has a motive
“to finance his own use of the drug and to assure himself of a ready
supply.”153 Second, the defendant would have the opportunity to
distribute the drug because evidence of his possession, if that possession
144. See Logan, 121 F.3d at 1178; Butler, 102 F.3d at 1195–96; Gadison, 8 F.3d at 192.
145. Butler, 102 F.3d at 1195–96; see also Logan, 121 F.3d at 1178; Gadison, 8 F.3d at
192.
146. Logan, 121 F.3d at 1178; Gadison, 8 F.3d at 192 (“[I]n a conspiracy case the mere
entry of a not guilty plea raises the issue of intent sufficiently to justify the admissibility of
[uncharged conduct] evidence.” (quoting United States v. Prati, 861 F.2d 82, 86 (5th Cir.
1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
147. See Logan, 121 F.3d at 1178; Butler, 102 F.3d at 1195–96; Gadison, 8 F.3d at 192.
148. See Logan, 121 F.3d at 1178; Butler, 102 F.3d at 1195–96; Gadison, 8 F.3d at 192.
149. See United States v. Templeman, 965 F.2d 617, 619 (8th Cir. 1992); see also United
States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 726 (6th Cir. 2002) (Gibson, J. dissenting).
150. Haywood, 280 F.3d at 726 (Gibson, J. dissenting).
151. Id. at 726 (“Evidence that a defendant carries a certain kind of drug with him
suggests a degree of involvement in the trade that tends to support an inference of intent to
distribute that drug at another time.”).
152. See Templeman, 965 F.2d at 619; see also Haywood, 280 F.3d at 726 (Gibson, J.
dissenting).
153. See sources cited supra note 152.
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were placed in the context of usage with others, shows that he or she
had available clientele.154
As such, courts favoring the admissibility of uncharged possession
evidence reason that (1) the defendant has by necessity put his or her
intent at issue155 and (2) uncharged possession evidence is independently
probative of a defendant’s intent to distribute that drug due to his or her
implicit connections with the drug world.156
IV. POSSIBLE RATIONALES TO FIND UNCHARGED POSSESSION
EVIDENCE PROBATIVE OF INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE
Despite the fact that some courts of appeals have questioned
whether uncharged possession evidence can ever be probative of a
defendant’s intent to distribute a drug,157 there is certainly enough
debate surrounding the issue to merit an analysis into the probative
value of such evidence in several different contexts.158 In general,
whether uncharged conduct evidence is probative on the defendant’s
intent depends on the context in which the evidence has been offered.159
As such, in order to thoroughly analyze whether such evidence is in fact
probative of intent, this author will separate the question according to
key factual differences: (1) whether the defendant has specifically called
his or her intent into question, (2) whether the uncharged possession
evidence dealt with distribution-sized quantities, (3) whether the
defendant had possessed drugs on several prior occasions, and (4)
whether the uncharged possession evidence dealt with a quantity of the
drug not contrary to personal use and was a singular instance of the
defendant’s possession of such a drug. In order to analyze these
differing factual scenarios, several hypothetical situations may serve to
illustrate when uncharged possession evidence may be probative on the
issue of intent.
154. See sources cited supra note 152.
155. See United States v. Logan, 121 F.3d 1172, 1178 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Butler, 102 F.3d 1191, 1195–96 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Gadison, 8 F.3d 186, 192 (5th
Cir. 1993).
156. See sources cited supra note 152.
157. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 444 (3d Cir. 2013) (“A prior
conviction for possessing drugs by no means suggests that the defendant intends to distribute
them in the future.”).
158. See, e.g., Tarlow, supra note 70.
159. See LEONARD, supra note 138, § 7.5 (noting that, where the probative value of the
evidence is minimal, uncharged conduct evidence should readily be excluded, especially when
the risk of unfair prejudice is high).

1408

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[98:1383

Hypothetical 1: A drives B’s car. A police officer stops A and
subsequently finds a distribution-sized quantity of cocaine in the trunk
of the car. A protests his or her guilt at trial, claiming to have been an
innocent bystander. In response to A’s innocent bystander claim, the
prosecutor offers uncharged possession evidence to demonstrate that A
in fact had the intent to distribute the drugs found in the vehicle. This
uncharged possession evidence shows that A had previously possessed a
personal-sized amount of cocaine.
Hypothetical 2: Same as Hypothetical 1, except A does not claim to
be an innocent bystander. Instead, A claims to have intended to use the
cocaine for his or her own personal use.
Hypothetical 3: Same as Hypothetical 1, except A’s previous
possession was for a distribution-sized amount of cocaine.
Hypothetical 4: Same as Hypothetical 1, except A had previously
been found in possession of distribution-sized quantities of cocaine on
twelve separate occasions, also while driving someone else’s automobile.
In addition, the prosecutor seeks to offer all twelve instances of A’s
uncharged possession evidence to demonstrate A’s intent to distribute
the drugs found in his or her trunk on this occasion.
A. The Defendant Has Specifically Called His or Her Intent Into
Question
Because intent is always at issue in a formalistic sense when a
defendant is on trial for a specific intent crime,160 courts should require
that intent be a material issue in a case before allowing uncharged
conduct evidence to prove that element of the crime. In Beechum,161 the
Fifth Circuit developed a two-step test to determine whether uncharged
conduct is admissible.162 The first step of this test asks whether the
evidence is relevant to an issue other than character, and the second
step asks whether the uncharged conduct’s unfair prejudice substantially
outweighs its marginal probative value.163 When undertaking the second
step of the test, FRE 403’s balancing test, the risk of unfair prejudice is
that the jury will decide the case on a basis other than the facts before
it.164 In addition, the evidence’s marginal probative value depends on
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 70, § 5242, at 151.
582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 911; see supra Part II.C.
Beechum, 582 F.2d at 911.
Rule 404(b) Other Crimes Evidence, supra note 15, at 635. Significantly, the jury
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the extent to which the proposition the evidence tends to prove is
actually in controversy and whether the evidence makes that
proposition more or less likely.165
However, in spite of this deceptively simple-looking analysis, this
analysis becomes much more esoteric when using uncharged conduct to
prove intent because intent is often an “ultimate issue in the case.”166
Because intent is an element of many crimes,167 a defendant’s uncharged
conduct would be relevant to prove his or her intent if it had “any
tendency to make [the defendant’s intent] more or less probable.”168 As
a result, some courts have added the requirement that intent be a
material issue in the case on top of relevancy.169 For example,
Hypothetical 1 and Hypothetical 2 highlight the difference between
cases where intent is, or is not, a material issue. In Hypothetical 1, the
defendant is claiming to have been an innocent bystander because the
defendant does not concede ownership or control of the illegal
may convict the defendant because of his deficient character and a presumption that he needs
to be punished. Id. Further, the jury may simply give too much weight to the evidence. Id.
For example, evidence that has no bearing on the crime committed yet tends to prove that the
defendant “smoked, drank[,] and was born out of wedlock” may be sufficient to warrant an
appellate court’s reversal. Id. at 635 n.4 (citing United States v. Bledsoe, 531 F.2d 888, 891
(8th Cir. 1976)).
165. See, e.g., Beechum, 582 F.2d at 916 (noting that the defendant had clearly called his
intent into question by conceding every other element of the offense).
166. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 70, § 5242, at 151. Obviously, intent is an
ultimate issue when determining a defendant’s guilt for the crime “possession with intent to
distribute.” See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 447 (3rd Cir. 2013).
167. LEONARD, supra note 138, § 7.1–.2.2.
168. FED. R. EVID. 401. The full text of FRE 401 is as follows: “Evidence is relevant if:
(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”
169. United States. v. Fierson, 419 F.2d 1020, 1023 (7th Cir. 1969) (“[I]t is necessary that
willfulness and intent be more than merely formal issues in the sense that the defendant is
entitled to an instruction thereon.”) (citing United States v. Magee, 261 F.2d 609 (7th Cir.
1958)); see also WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 70, § 5242, at 153. Where courts have held
that intent must be a material issue at trial, stipulating to the issue of intent would most likely
remove it from the case; however, testimony from the defendant denying his or her intent
would put it at issue. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 70, § 5242, at 153. One
commentator in particular has argued that the admission of uncharged conduct evidence
often serves purposes contrary to public policy. See Uviller, supra note 6, at 882. This
commentator proposes that the admission of uncharged conduct is often extremely prejudicial
to the criminal defendant despite the tenuous link between veracity in the present case and
uncharged conduct showing bad character. See id. Further, this commentator suggests that
the sorting of uncharged conduct into admissible or inadmissible evidence is often a sham and
that the admission of uncharged conduct threatens the criminal defendant’s constitutional
right to present evidence in his or her own defense. See id.
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substance; however, in Hypothetical 2, the defendant is directly putting
intent at issue by claiming to have intended to use the cocaine for
personal use rather than for distribution. As such, by placing intent at
issue, the defendant is forcing the prosecution to prove that issue.
Despite the disagreement among the federal courts of appeals,170
whenever intent is not a material issue at trial, uncharged conduct
evidence should be deemed too prejudicial under a FRE 403 balancing
test. This conclusion rests on the premise that, where the defendant has
not actively placed his or her intent at issue, the marginal probative
value evidence will be extremely limited.171 Even though a specific
intent crime implies that the actor’s state of mind cannot be inferred
from the actus reus,172 this fact should not raise the evidence’s marginal
probative value merely because a defendant who denies his or her guilt
has forced the government to prove every element of the offense.173 If
the government’s obligation to prove the intent element of a crime
would be all it took for the proverbial floodgates to open, FRE 404(b)
would cease to have any meaningful effect in cases where intent is an

170. Compare United States v. Lee, 724 F.3d 968, 976 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that a
defendant only formally puts intent at issue when claiming an innocent bystander defense),
and United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715 (6th Cir. 2002), and United States v. Santini, 656
F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2011), and United States v. Monzon, 869 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1989), with
United States v. Logan, 121 F.3d 1172, 1178 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that even where a
defendant does not raise a defense based on lack of knowledge, uncharged possession
evidence is probative of a defendant’s intent), and United States v. Butler, 102 F.3d 1191
(11th Cir. 1997), and United States v. Gadison, 8 F.3d 186 (5th Cir. 1993), and United States
v. Templeman, 965 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1992). Courts that routinely admit uncharged conduct
because the charged crime is a specific intent crime reason that a defendant’s “specific intent
. . . cannot be inferred from the act.” Rodriguez, supra note 15, at 461. As a result, the need
for the evidence would strengthen its incremental probative value when undertaking an FRE
403 balancing test. Id. at 461–62. However, some courts have reasoned that, where specific
intent can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances, the uncharged conduct should not
be admissible. See United States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776, 781 (7th Cir. 1984); see also
Rodriguez, supra note 15, at 462.
171. See Lee, 724 F.3d at 976 (citing United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 696 (7th Cir.
2012)).
172. Rodriguez, supra note 15, at 461–62 (noting that some courts conclude that the
marginal probative value of a piece of evidence is heightened because there is a greater need
for uncharged conduct evidence).
173. See Lee, 724 F.3d at 979. But see Logan, 121 F.3d at 1178 (holding that even where
a defendant does not raise a defense based on lack of knowledge, uncharged possession
evidence is probative of a defendant’s intent); Butler, 102 F.3d at 1195–96; Gadison, 8 F.3d at
192; Templeman, 965 F.2d at 619.
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element of the crime.174 Finally, admitting uncharged conduct evidence
whenever the charged crime is a specific intent crime would ignore the
purposes of the character evidence rule.175 There are several policy
reasons for keeping the character evidence rule: First, the character
evidence rule instructs jurors to not punish the defendant because of his
or her past actions;176 second, psychological studies suggest that, once
the jury determines a defendant’s character, it is likely to determine that
the defendant acted in accordance with that character;177 third, there is
little confidence that character is an accurate predictor of conduct.178
B. Distribution-Sized Quantities
When the uncharged possession evidence deals with a fordistribution quantity of the drug, the evidence is likely inadmissible
because such evidence relies on propensity reasoning.179 The uncharged
possession evidence’s marginal probative value in Hypothetical 3 also
depends on the extent to which the uncharged possession evidence tends
to make the defendant’s intent in the present case more or less
probable.180 Of course, the evidence would be relevant under a
character theory of reasoning.181 However, this type of reasoning,
174. Lee, 724 F.3d at 979 (reasoning that the government’s obligation to prove intent
should not open the door to FRE 404(b) evidence).
175. See Imwinkelried, supra note 5, at 580–82; see also Milich, supra note 32, at 781–84
(discussing the justifications for the character evidence rule). For example, commentators
have questioned the extent to which jurors are able to exclude the propensity inference when
making a deliberation:
In a murder case the jurors’ reaction to a prior theft conviction would differ from
their reaction to a prior murder conviction. With respect to both, however, it seems
certain that the stimulus information—the evidence about his prior criminal
activity—would play a “central” role in the impressions formed of the defendant.
Robert G. Lawson, Credibility and Character: A Different Look at an Interminable Problem,
50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 758, 776 (1975).
176. See Imwinkelried, supra note 5, at 580–82.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See supra Part I.
180. See United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 914 n.18 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting that
evidence aside from the uncharged conduct may decrease the evidence’s tendency to make a
fact more or less probable).
181. See infra Figure 2. Commentators have also noted that trait theory has had a
resurgence in that “highly particularized character traits” are considered to be predictive of
behavior with a reasonable degree of certainty. See Imwinkelried, An Evidentiary Paradox,
supra note 15, at 423 (citing Susan Marlene Davies, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct:
A Reassessment of Relevancy, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 504, 515–17 (1991)). But see David P.
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pictured in Figure 2 below, is forbidden under FRE 404(b) because it
argues that the defendant has acted in conformity with his or her bad
character.182
Figure 2

Item of Evidence
The defendant’s
uncharged possession
of distribution-sized
quantities of cocaine.

Intermediate
Inference
The defendant’s bad
character.

Ultimate Inference
The defendant acted
in conformity with
his bad character on
this occasion.

Therefore, in order for this uncharged possession evidence to be
probative of intent, it must be relevant without undertaking character
reasoning.183
The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Haywood184
considered whether uncharged possession evidence possessed
independent probative value.185 In that case, the court hinged its
holding on a substantial-similarity test.186 Under this substantialLeonard, The Use of Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis in the Law of
Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 28 (1986).
The extreme assumption that global, highly generalized traits are omnipresent
causal entities and can be inferred readily from almost any indicators, and that they
determine just about everything that is important, need not be replaced with the
equally extreme (and indefensible) assumption that people do not behave in
organized, patterned and potentially predictable ways in given domains, or that the
“situation”—whatever it is—accounts for nearly everything.
Leonard, supra, at 28 (quoting Walter Mischel, Alternatives in the Pursuit of the Predictability
and Consistency of Persons: Stable Data that Yield Unstable Interpretations, 51 J.
PERSONALITY 578, 580 (1983)).
182. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
183. See id.
184. 280 F.3d 715 (6th Cir. 2002).
185. Id. at 721–22.
186. Id. (noting that the district court had inferred the defendant’s intent from the
quantity involved in an uncharged offense, and reversing that court’s decision); see also Stone,
supra note 88, at 955–56 (noting that in criminal cases “similarity” between the uncharged
conduct evidence and the charged crime will generally occur when the uncharged conduct
constitutes the same crime as the charged crime, but also noting that this identity of the
crimes is not essential). See supra note 88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the term
“similarity” as it is used throughout this Comment.
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similarity test, the court required the government to show that the
defendant intended to distribute the uncharged possession evidence at
issue, 1.3 grams of crack cocaine.187 By requiring a substantial similarity
between the uncharged possession evidence and the charged crime, the
court sought to check the evidence’s relevancy toward a non-character
use.188 Because the government did not offer any evidence showing that
1.3 grams of crack cocaine was inconsistent with personal use or that the
defendant had intended to distribute the 1.3 grams of crack cocaine,189
the court held that the uncharged possession evidence was not probative
of the defendant’s intent to distribute.190
Figure 3

Item of Evidence

Intermediate
Inference

Ultimate Inference

The defendant’s
uncharged possession
of distribution-sized
quantities of cocaine.

The defendant
intended to distribute
the uncharged
possession evidence.

The defendant had
the intent to
distribute cocaine on
this occasion.

Under this reasoning, since the uncharged possession evidence in
Haywood was only inadmissible because the government failed to show
that the defendant had intended to distribute the uncharged possession
evidence, then uncharged possession evidence that demonstrates the
defendant’s intent to distribute must be logically probative of his intent
to distribute the drugs involved in the charged crime.191 However, this
reasoning rests on the premise that the evidence was only inadmissible
because the uncharged possession evidence was not similar enough to
the charged crime. Scrutinizing this premise, it is unclear from the Sixth
Circuit’s opinion in Haywood how a distribution-sized quantity of the

187. Haywood, 280 F.3d at 721–22.
188. Id. at 721–22; see infra Figure 3.
189. Haywood, 280 F.3d at 722.
190. Id.
191. See id. at 721–22 (holding that the government needs to prove a substantial
similarity between uncharged possession evidence and the defendant’s intent to distribute in
the charged crime).
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drug would support the inference of the defendant’s intent without
resorting to the forbidden propensity inference.192
Despite the majority’s lack of reasoning as to why distribution-sized
quantities of drugs would be probative of a defendant’s intent to
distribute, Circuit Judge Gibson, writing in dissent, noted a rationale for
situations where both the charged crime and the uncharged possession
evidence are of distribution-sized quantities: “Evidence that a defendant
carries a certain kind of drug with him suggests a degree of involvement
in the trade that tends to support an inference of intent to distribute that
drug at another time.”193 Following this reasoning, in order to support
the inference of the defendant’s involvement in the drug trade, the
uncharged possession evidence must be of a sufficient quantity to be
undoubtedly a for-distribution size, or the defendant’s intent with
respect to the uncharged possession evidence must be independently
proven through circumstantial evidence.194 However, as the Seventh
Circuit noted in United States v. Lee,195 this reasoning essentially comes
to the conclusion that “[the defendant] intended to do it before, . . . so
he [or she] must have intended to do it again.”196 This conclusion is
really just propensity reasoning in disguise because it is impossible to get
from the inference that the defendant intended to distribute the
uncharged possession evidence to the conclusion that the defendant had

192. See id.
193. Id. at 726 (Gibson, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Templeman, 965 F.2d 617,
619 (8th Cir. 1992)). The inference drawn generally about the defendant’s intent to distribute
from the defendant’s possession of the drug is much stronger when the defendant possessed a
for-distribution amount of the drug. See id. at 721–22 (noting that possession of 1.3 grams of
crack cocaine was not substantially similar to the charged crime of possession with intent to
distribute).
194. Id. The court in Haywood noted that circumstantial evidence may be offered with
respect towards intent such as showing that the drugs were allotted into separate bags and
weighed the same amount. Id. at 722. This author seeks to analyze whether a distributionsized quantity of drugs is probative of a defendant’s intent for a charged crime. This author
does not seek to determine whether the threat of unfair prejudice would outweigh the
probative value in these situations. However, other commentators have posited that it would.
Sonenshein, supra note 98, at 217 (noting that the threat of unfair prejudice is greatest in
situations where the uncharged conduct evidence is extremely similar to the charged crime).
Interestingly, this similarity between the uncharged possession evidence of for-distribution
quantities of cocaine and the charged crime, possession with intent to distribute,
simultaneously makes the evidence more probative and extremely prejudicial. See id.
195. 724 F.3d 968 (7th Cir. 2013).
196. Id. at 976 (quoting United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 699 (7th Cir. 2012)).
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the intent to distribute drugs on this occasion without invoking some
propensity rationale.197
Figure 4
Item of
Evidence
The
defendant’s
uncharged
possession
evidence of
distributionsized quantities
of cocaine.

First Inference
The defendant
intended to
distribute the
uncharged
possession
evidence.

Second
Inference

Ultimate
Inference

The
defendant’s
behavior forms
an unchanging
pattern, i.e.,
the defendant
has a bad
character.

The defendant
had the intent
to distribute
cocaine on this
occasion.

Further, even supposing that there is a propensity-free chain of
reasoning, the marginal probative value of the uncharged possession
evidence would be heavily discounted. In Hypothetical 3 above, the
defendant had previously possessed a distribution-sized amount of
cocaine and claimed at trial to have been an innocent bystander.198 As
such, the uncharged possession evidence’s marginal probative value is
diminished in two senses. First, the defendant is not actively contesting
the intent element of the crime by claiming to have possessed the drugs
for a less culpable purpose.199 Instead, the defendant is claiming to have
been wholly innocent of the crime.200 As such, the defendant’s intent is
only formalistically at issue and is not a material issue.201 Second, there
197. See infra Figure 4. Additionally, other commentators have pointed out the illogic
behind admitting uncharged possession evidence on the point of intent. See Sonenshein,
supra note 98, at 218 (quoting Andrew J. Morris, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The
Fictitious Ban on Character Reasoning from Other Crime Evidence, 17 REV. LITIG. 181, 191–
92 (1998)).
198. See supra Part IV.
199. See Lee, 724 F.3d at 979 (“Lee did not pursue the type of defense which would
have raised particular questions—about what he knew, what his purpose was, and whether his
proximity to the cocaine was inadvertent—that his prior cocaine conviction might help the
jury to answer.”); see also supra Part IV.A for a discussion of how calling intent into question
raises the evidence’s marginal probative value.
200. See supra Part IV for the facts of the hypothetical.
201. See Lee, 724 F.3d at 979.
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is already evidence tending to prove that whoever possessed the drugs
had the intent to distribute those drugs. That evidence is the presence
of a distribution-sized quantity of cocaine, which is the basis for the
charged crime.202 Because there is no propensity-free chain of reasoning
to conclude that uncharged possession evidence is probative of a
defendant’s intent to distribute and because the marginal probative
value in Hypothetical 3 would be heavily discounted, such evidence
should not be deemed admissible.203
C. Doctrine of Chances
The doctrine of chances is a non-character theory of admissibility
that is distinguishable from propensity reasoning in a crucial way.
Under the doctrine of chances, the ultimate inference is not that the
defendant acted in conformity with his or her character.204 Rather, the
doctrine of chances reasons that it is unlikely that the accused’s motive
was innocent when he or she had been party to several similar
incidents.205

202. The quantity of the drugs being of a for-distribution size leads to the inference that
the defendant is generally involved in the drug trade. See supra notes 191, 194 and
accompanying text. However, that inference necessarily relies on propensity reasoning. See
supra notes 196–97 and accompanying text.
203. See United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 916–17 (5th Cir. 1978)
(acknowledging a high probative value because of a lack of evidence not in contention among
other factors).
204. See Imwinkelried, supra note 5, at 595; see also Imwinkelried, An Evidentiary
Paradox, supra note 15, at 446–53 (arguing that the basis for the doctrine of chances is
statistical and that eliminating random chance as a possibility to explain every outcome leaves
a jury with rationales other than propensity reasoning).
205. See, e.g., WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 70, § 5242, at 152; Imwinkelried, supra
note 5, at 595; Melilli, supra note 15, at 1564 (“The doctrine is premised on the improbability
of multiple coincidences.”); infra Figure 5. “[W]hen the evidence shows that [the defendant]
has made similar ‘mistakes’ before, our doubts grow. It is the improbability of these fortuities
rather than any inference as to the character of the accused that supports the belief in guilt.”
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 70, § 5242, at 152. It is important to note that the doctrine
of chances reasoning does not result in the ultimate conclusion that all of the uncharged
conduct evidence was the result of a defendant’s actus reus or mens rea. Imwinkelried, An
Evidentiary Paradox, supra note 15, at 437. “At most, all that the doctrine establishes is that
one or some of the incidents were probably the product of an actus reus or mens rea.” Id. at
438.
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Figure 5

Item of Evidence
The accused’s
uncharged acts.

Intermediate
Inference
The objective
improbability of the
accused’s innocent
involvement in so
many incidents.

Ultimate Inference
The mens rea.

For example, in Hypothetical 4 above, where the defendant had
been found with distribution-sized quantities of cocaine in B’s car on
twelve separate occasions,206 the prosecutor would seek to argue that it
was unlikely that one person could find himself or herself innocently in
possession of distribution-sized quantities of cocaine on so many
different occasions.207
The leading case on the doctrine of chances is United States v.
Woods.208 In that case, Martha L. Woods was found guilty of murdering
her eight-month-old foster son, Paul Woods.209 The court of appeals
noted the “bizarre series of events” that took place surrounding Paul’s
death.210 On five separate occasions, two of which occurred on the same

206. See supra Part IV.
207. See Imwinkelried, supra note 5, at 594. Dean Wigmore posited the following
hypothetical:
Thus, if A while hunting with B hears the bullet from B’s gun whistling past his
head, he is willing to accept B’s bad aim or B’s accidental tripping as a conceivable
explanation; but if shortly afterwards the same thing happens again, and if on the
third occasion A receives B’s bullet in his body, the immediate inference (i.e. as a
probability, perhaps not a certainty) is that B shot at A deliberately; because the
chances of an inadvertent shooting on three successive similar occasions are
extremely small; or (to put it in another way) because inadvertence or accident is
only an abnormal or occasional explanation for the discharge of a gun at a given
object, and therefore the recurrence of a similar result (i.e. discharge towards the
same object, A) excludes the fair possibility of such an abnormal cause and points
out the cause as probably a more natural and usual one, i.e. a deliberate discharge
at A.
LEONARD, supra note 138, § 7.3.2.
208. 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973).
209. Id. at 128–29.
210. Id. at 129.
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day, Paul needed resuscitation after having been found blue from a lack
of oxygen.211 On each of these occasions, Paul was in Martha’s
custody.212 On the fifth occasion, Paul slipped into a coma and died
about a month later.213 In order to prove that Paul’s asphyxiation was
not accidental, the government introduced evidence that Martha had
control of nine children who together had at least twenty such episodes
of breathing difficulties.214 Seven of these children died from breathing
complications.215 Because of the remote possibility that so many
children in Martha’s care would suffer and die from apparently the same
cause of death without Martha’s wrongdoing, the court held that
Martha’s conviction for murder should be affirmed.216
Unlike in Woods, where the court used the doctrine of chances to
prove Martha’s actus reus,217 a court using the doctrine of chances to
prove the defendant’s intent would be using that doctrine to prove the
defendant’s mens rea.218 As such, the inference sought to be established
by the prosecutor using the doctrine of chances would be that there was
an extremely small possibility that the defendant possessed an innocent
mens rea while committing the actus reus of the crime.219
In Hypothetical 4 above, it is likely that the uncharged possession
evidence would be probative of the defendant’s intent to distribute. The
evidence that the defendant has been found with distribution-sized
quantities of cocaine on twelve separate instances makes it extremely
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 130.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 135.
217. See id. at 135–36.
218. See supra Figure 4. The court would be inferring the defendant’s intent from the
defendant’s unlikely innocent involvement in a series of acts. The reasoning in Beechum
represents a line of reasoning used by the doctrine of chances. See United States v. Beechum,
582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978). As David P. Leonard described it, Beechum’s possession of
the credit cards was unlawful and occurred simultaneously with his possession of the coin.
LEONARD, supra note 138, § 7.3.2. Because the credit cards in Beechum’s possession were
mailed to the recipients months ahead of time, Beechum, 582 F.2d at 903, Beechum’s
possession of these cards supports the inference that he intended to keep the credit cards.
LEONARD, supra note 138, § 7.3.2. As Beechum intended to keep the credit cards, it was
unlikely that Beechum simultaneously intended to return the stolen coin. Beechum, 582 F.2d
at 909.
219. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 70, § 5242, at 152 (“It is the improbability of
these fortuities rather than any inference as to the character of the accused that supports the
belief in guilt.”); Imwinkelried, supra note 5, at 595.
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unlikely that he or she would have innocently possessed the drugs on all
twelve occasions because the average person will likely never be found
with distribution-sized quantities of a drug unless he or she intended to
distribute those drugs.220 Thus, the uncharged possession evidence
would be probative of the defendant’s intent to distribute because this
evidence would decrease the likelihood that each of the twelve separate
possessions were innocent; therefore, the probability that the defendant
innocently possessed the cocaine on this occasion would also decrease.221
D. Personal-Sized Quantities and a Singular Instance
In circuits that require intent to be a material issue at trial,222
uncharged possession evidence is not probative of a defendant’s intent
to distribute when that evidence was not a for-distribution quantity. As
demonstrated above, there are several situations where uncharged
possession evidence may be probative of a defendant’s intent to
distribute.223
Despite these situations, the question of whether
uncharged possession evidence is probative of a defendant’s intent to
distribute still needs to be answered when none of the above factors are
present. As of yet, no court has answered this question in the
affirmative. In finding uncharged possession evidence probative of a
defendant’s intent to distribute, some courts have done so because

220. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 70, § 5242, at 152; Imwinkelried, supra note
5, at 595. Whether the doctrine of chances will provide a non-character inference as to intent
depends on the complexity of the uncharged conduct and on the number of the acts.
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 70, § 5242, at 153–55. Where the act is of more complexity,
even a single act may be sufficient to support the inference that it was unlikely that the
defendant had such an event happen twice. See State v. Johns, 725 P.2d 312, 324 (Or. 1986).
In that case, the defendant had shot his wife. Id. at 313. He claimed that the shooting was
accidental. Id. However, six years before that incident, he had also attempted to kill his
previous wife. Id. at 315. The court held that due to the substantial similarities between the
charged crime and the uncharged conduct, the uncharged conduct was probative of the
defendant’s intent to murder his wife. Id. at 321. In both cases, the defendant had previously
loaded a gun, was not intoxicated, entered spouse’s premises (in both cases the marriage was
disintegrating), called the police, and threatened suicide. Id. at 325.
221. See FED. R. EVID. 401 (noting that a piece of evidence is probative of a fact that
has any tendency to increase or decrease the probability that the fact exists).
222. See United States v. Lee, 724 F.3d 968, 979 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v.
Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 720 (6th Cir. 2002).
223. See supra Parts IV.A, C (discussing how the quantity of the drug possessed, the
number of prior possessions under similar circumstances, and the defendant’s affirmative
defense to his or her intent all affect the probative value of uncharged possession evidence
rendering it more or less likely to be admissible under FRE 403’s balancing test).
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possession with intent to distribute is a specific intent crime.224 As such,
under those courts’ reasoning, uncharged possession evidence’s
probative value would by necessity be increased because the defendant’s
mental state cannot be inferred from the actus reus itself.225
However, as there are differing opinions amongst the circuits on
whether a specific intent crime automatically raises the uncharged
possession evidence’s probative value,226 the question of whether
uncharged possession evidence is probative of a defendant’s intent to
distribute should be answered assuming that uncharged possession
evidence does not receive additional marginal probative value simply
because possession with intent to distribute is a specific-intent crime.
After surveying the case law, it is obvious that, without assuming an
increased marginal probative value, courts have not found uncharged
possession evidence probative of a defendant’s intent to distribute.227 In
addition, when the charged crime is a specific intent offense, courts
raising the evidence’s probative value have not considered the probative
value that the evidence would have on its own.228
Further, it is important to distinguish someone’s motive or
opportunity to distribute drugs as opposed to his or her intent to
distribute drugs. This distinction is essential because there is support in
the case law for the proposition that uncharged possession evidence may
be probative of a defendant’s motive or opportunity to distribute
drugs.229 For example, in United States v. Templeman,230 the court
reasoned that personal possession of cocaine may be probative of the

224. See United States v. Logan, 121 F.3d 1172, 1178 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Butler, 102 F.3d 1191, 1196 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Gadison, 8 F.3d 186, 192 (5th
Cir. 1993); see also WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 70, § 5242, at 153; supra Part IV.A
(noting how some courts hold that the marginal probative value increases when the offense is
a specific intent crime).
225. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 70, § 5242 at 153; supra Part IV.A (coming to
a contrary conclusion but acknowledging the split in authority).
226. See supra Part IV.A.
227. United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 444 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Possession and
distribution are distinct acts—far more people use drugs than sell them—and these acts have
different purposes and risks.”); Lee, 724 F.3d at 979 (holding that possession with intent to
distribute may later be probative of a defendant’s intent but that straight possession may not);
see also Haywood, 280 F.3d 715; United States v. Santini, 656 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Monzon, 869 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1989).
228. See Logan, 121 F.3d at 1177; Butler, 102 F.3d 1191; Gadison, 8 F.3d at 192; United
States v. Templeman, 965 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1992).
229. See Templeman, 965 F.2d at 619.
230. 965 F.2d 617.
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defendant’s motive to distribute because he or she would be able “to
finance his [or her] own use of the drug and [would] assure himself [or
herself] of a ready supply.”231 Additionally, a defendant may have the
opportunity to distribute because he or she will likely know people to
sell to if he or she uses the drug with others.232 Circuit Judge Gibson
from the Sixth Circuit noted in dissent that possession of a drug suggests
“involvement in the [drug] trade that tends to support an inference of
intent to distribute that drug at another time.”233
While uncharged possession evidence may be probative of a
defendant’s opportunity or motive to distribute drugs,234 it is likely not
probative of his or her intent to distribute drugs when the uncharged
possession evidence was in a personal-use amount,235 the defendant has
not called intent specifically into question,236 and the prosecution cannot
use the doctrine of chances to objectively reason that it was unlikely that
the defendant innocently committed the actus reus.237 This conclusion
rests on the proposition that there are key distinctions between
possession of a drug and distribution of that drug. As the Third Circuit
noted in United States v. Davis,238
A prior conviction for possessing drugs by no means suggests
that the defendant intends to distribute them in the future.
“Acts related to the personal use of a controlled substance are of
a wholly different order than acts involving the distribution of a
controlled substance. One activity involves the personal abuse of
narcotics.” The other usually involves the “implementation of a
commercial activity for profit.”239

231. Id. at 619.
232. Id. at 619.
233. United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 726 (6th Cir. 2002) (Gibson, J., dissenting)
(citing Templeman, 965 F.2d at 619).
234. See Templeman, 965 F.2d at 619.
235. See supra Part IV.B (arguing that distribution-sized quantities of a drug may be
probative of the defendant’s intent to distribute that drug on a later occasion because the
larger quantity supports a much stronger inference that the defendant was involved with the
drug trade in general).
236. See supra Part IV.A (arguing that courts should require intent to be a material
issue at trial in order for uncharged possession evidence’s marginal probative value to
increase).
237. See supra Part IV.C.
238. 726 F.3d 434 (3d Cir. 2013).
239. Id. at 444 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Ono, 918 F.2d 1462, 1465
(9th Cir. 1990)).
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It seems like a rather large leap to go from someone’s personal
abuse of narcotics to that same person conspiring to sell great quantities
of that same substance for his or her own profit. In addition to the
differing nature of the crimes,240 the penalties imposed on a perpetrator
are different in both cases—suggesting that someone who may not mind
breaking the law to personally abuse narcotics may be deterred by the
greater penalties associated with distribution of that same drug.241
Using the rationales described throughout Part IV of this Comment,
it is unlikely that the uncharged possession evidence in Hypothetical 1
would have enough probative value to pass an FRE 403 balancing test.
Without (1) the assumption that a specific intent crime raises the
uncharged possession evidence’s marginal probative value, (2) the
substantial similarity between the uncharged possession evidence and
the charged crime demonstrated by a for-distribution amount of the
drug, or (3) the defendant’s numerous other incidents, there is no
rationale, other than propensity reasoning, to find uncharged possession
evidence probative of a defendant’s intent to distribute.242
Figure 6

Item of Evidence
The defendant’s
uncharged possession
of cocaine.

Intermediate
Inference
The defendant has a
bad character
because he has
possessed cocaine.

Ultimate Inference
The defendant had
the intent to
distribute cocaine on
this occasion.

240. Davis, 726 F.3d at 444 (noting that drug possession requires an inherently separate
frame of mind than does intent to distribute).
241. See BRIAN T. YEH, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., RL30722, DRUG
OFFENSES: MAXIMUM FINES AND TERMS OF IMPRISONMENT FOR VIOLATION OF THE
FEDERAL CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT AND RELATED LAWS (2012) (laying out the
different levels of punishments for drug possession offenses and distribution offenses).
Depending on the drug, offenses for distribution may land a perpetrator with a life
imprisonment. See id. However, simple possession is punished by a maximum sentence of
three years. See id. at 8.
242. See Imwinkelried, supra note 5, at 576; see also infra Figure 6. Note how Figure 6 is
the same as Figure 1 by analogy.
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V. CONCLUSION
Determining whether uncharged possession evidence is probative of
a defendant’s mens rea is one of the more complicated issues involved in
a criminal trial.243 Overzealous inclusion of such evidence threatens to
undo the entire character evidence rule.244 With respect to the issue of
whether a defendant’s uncharged possession evidence is probative of his
or her intent to distribute a drug, the United States Courts of Appeals
have come to varying conclusions.245 The largest difference between the
circuits involved in this circuit split arises over whether a specific intent
crime automatically raises uncharged possession evidence’s marginal
probative value because intent is automatically at issue in the trial.246
With respect to this issue, courts should require that, before uncharged
possession evidence is admissible to prove intent, intent be a material
issue at trial. This requirement ensures that the purposes behind the
character evidence rule are still given effect.247
In construing these purposes, keeping an eye on the historical
context in which FRE 404(b) was adopted is of the utmost importance.
The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Beechum248 wrote an outstanding
opinion on the issue of intent with respect to the character evidence
rule. This opinion is the basis for the courts of appeals’ tests in
determining the admissibility of character evidence to prove intent.249
Applying this test to uncharged possession evidence, courts should find
uncharged possession evidence probative of a defendant’s intent to
distribute in limited situations. These situations lend the evidence
heightened marginal probative power.
Finally, due to the limited probative value of evidence tending to
prove a point that is not at issue,250 uncharged possession evidence is not
likely probative of a defendant’s intent to distribute where the evidence
is of a personal-use amount and the defendant is involved in only a

243. See LEONARD, supra note 138, § 7.1–.2.1.
244. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 70, § 5242, at 152–53 (“[T]he routine use of this
exception [of admitting uncharged conduct to demonstrate intent] could easily destroy the
[character evidence] rule.”).
245. See supra Part III.
246. See supra Part IV.A.
247. See Imwinkelried, supra note 5, at 580–82.
248. 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978).
249. See supra Part III (noting how the tests developed by the courts of appeals are
essentially the Beechum test).
250. Beechum, 582 F.2d at 916.
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single instance. The intent involved in both crimes is inherently
different. In one crime, a person is personally abusing a prohibited
substance.251 In the other crime, a person is marketing a drug as a
commodity for his or her own personal, financial gain.252 As a result,
admitting such evidence against a defendant really just argues that the
defendant is a bad man and should be punished as such. It would seem
that, despite FRE 404(b)’s inclusionary nature, uncharged possession
evidence for personal-sized quantities of a drug falls within “a small and
shrinking subset” of evidence not admissible as an exception to the
character evidence rule.253
JAMES DECLEENE*

251. United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 444 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing United States v.
Ono, 918 F.2d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1990)).
252. Id.
253. See Milich, supra note 32, at 779 (“Although the rule still keeps out completely
unrelated evidence of an accused’s bad character, the many broad exceptions have reduced
what is ‘completely unrelated’ to a small and shrinking subset of the whole.”).
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